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Cutting the Gordian Knot of Legitimacy Theory?  





The question of legitimacy occupies center stage in debates on various 
constitutional developments. For as long as constitutional scholars cannot 
settle on a theory of legitimacy, the specter of a legitimacy deficit will 
continue to haunt the practitioners of constitutional law. Constitutional 
scholar Frank Michelman engages different schools of constitutional theory, 
seeking the definitive answer to the legitimacy question. He classifies 
theories of legitimacy into three categories, premised on notions of contract, 
acceptance, or authorship. Arguing that contract-based and acceptance- 
oriented legitimacy theories assume the notion of authorship, he 
distinguishes constitutional authorship in terms of its presumed 
transtemporal character and abandons it because of this character. To cut 
this Gordian knot, Michelman proposes a presentist view of legitimacy. 
Through an analysis of his theoretical engagement, this article argues that 
his effort to abandon authorship-based theories fails. A commonly chosen, 
authoritative dispute- settling institution, in line with Michelman’s presentist 
alternative, cannot stand without assuming a transtemporal concept of 
constitutional authorship. Thus the Gordian knot remains. 
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“We the People,” or its equivalent, appears in so many constitutions, all over the world, 
that “constitution”—as a verbal form defined in part by that phrase—may be said to 
have become a literary genre.1 While it may sound like anachronistic revolutionary 
rhetoric or, worse, an empty demagogic cliché,2 “We the People” presents a substantial 
principle around which to organize discussion of the legitimacy of constitutional 
democracy. Although it seems to distinguish the state—the archetype of the body 
                                                
1 See ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE? REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
184–85 (James Swenson trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (2001). Most exemplary is the United States 
Constitution, which starts with “We the People of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
French philosopher Étienne Balibar notes that the performative utterance of “[the] self-designation of the 
sovereign people” exemplified in “We the People of the United States of America” in the United States 
Constitution can be translated into a constative statement as expressed in the preamble to the German 
Constitution—“The German People has given itself the following Fundamental Law by virtue of its 
constituent power (. . . hat sich das Deutsche Volk kraft seiner verfassungsgebenden Gewalt diese 
Grudngesetz gegeben).” See id. at 273 n.6. 
2 Compare BALIBAR, supra note 1, at 185 (noting the persistent reference to “we the people” at times of 
insurrection), with MICHAEL MANN, THE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING ETHNIC CLEANSING 
55–69 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (discussing the relationship between two versions of “We the 
People” and genocides in history). 
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politic—from other political entities,3 it also figures in the transnational equation. 
Paralleling its traditional role in the nation building of modern states,4 “We the People” 
plays a role in the constitutional-legitimacy debate regarding European integration. Even 
when we dissociate the ideal of constitutional democracy on the European level from 
statehood,5 the notion of “We the People” remains relevant to the EU constitutional 
project; it may be construed in various ways in order to legitimize the EU as a 
supranational political entity.6 As Étienne Balibar would have it, the constitutional genre 
expresses “the functioning and use of ‘we’ [in ‘We the People’] as a self-designation of 
the sovereign people in proclamations of democratic rights.”7 If so, what is the magic 
power of “We the People” as the author of the constitution—that is, the idea of 
constitutional authorship 8 —in relation to the “spectral” existence of popular 
                                                
3 See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Integration by Constitution, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 193, 207–08 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Belknap 1990). 
5 Compare J.H.H. Weiler, Europe: The Case against the Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 43 (1998), with 
G. Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 29 (1998).  
6 See Hans Lindahl & Bert van Roermund, Law without a State? On Representing the Common Market, in 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS ORDER: THE LEGAL THEORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1, 8–13 
(Zenon Bankowski & Andrew Scott eds., Blackwell 2000). See also Erik Oddvar Eriksen, The EU and 
the Right to Self-Government, in DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 35, 45–46 (Erik Oddvar 
Eriksen et al. eds., Routledge 2004); J.H.H. Weiler, European Neo-constitutionalism: In Search of 
Foundations for the European Constitutional Order, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: 
EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 110–116 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 
Blackwell 1996). Cf. HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL 
COMMUNITY 169–173 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., MIT Press 2005) (2002); ULRICH K. PREUSS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 25–107 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Humanities 1995) (1990); Robert E. Goodin, Designing Constitutions: 
the Political Constitution of a Mixed Commonwealth, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: 
EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 223. But see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 11–31 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004); Jürgen 
Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution?, in DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, supra, at 
19, 27. 
7 See BALIBAR, supra note 1, at 184. 
8 For a discussion of the concept of authorship from the perspective of philosophical ethics, see DANIEL 
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 113–114 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
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sovereignty?9 What is the nature of its grip on our political imaginings regarding 
constitutional legitimacy?  
In Ida’s Way and other recent essays,10 constitutional scholar Frank Michelman 
engages a variety of theories of constitutional legitimacy, developing a tripartite 
argument with regard to this sixty-four-thousand-dollar question. First, Michelman aims 
to establish that existing legitimacy theories are all premised on constitutional 
authorship, whether they are presented as contract-based or acceptance-oriented. Second, 
Michelman points to the transtemporal character of constitutional authorship, which, 
taken together with the concomitant presupposed identity or authorship, constitute the 
Gordian knot of constitutional legitimacy theory. This knot comes into being because 
these vexed elements are not based on personal critical judgment, which lies at the core 
                                                
9 See BALIBAR, supra note 1, at 185. 
10See Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 TULSA L. REV. 649 (2004) [hereinafter 
Michelman, Reply]; Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. 
REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation]; Frank I. Michelman, Faith and 
Obligation, or What Makes Sandy Sweat?, 38 TULSA L. REV. 651 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Faith 
and Obligation]; Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental 
System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida’s Way]; Frank I. Michelman, Is 
the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST. STUD. 101 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, 
Contract for Legitimacy]; Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 579 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Judicial Supremacy]; Frank I. Michelman, The Problem of 
Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can “Discourses of Application” Help?, in HABERMAS AND 
PRAGMATISM 113 (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., Routledge 2002) [hereinafter Michelman, Interpretive 
Disagreement]; Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO 
JURIS 63 (2000) [hereinafter Michelman, Human Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship 
by the People, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1605 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and 
“Constitutional Patriotism,” 76 DENVER U.L. REV. 1009 (1999) [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional 
Patriotism]; Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 64 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter Michelman, 
Constitutional Authorship]; Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique 
of Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 145 
(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., MIT Press 1997) [hereinafter Michelman, Deliberative 
Democracy]. For an overview of Michelman’s scholarship on the issue of constitutional legitimacy in a 
liberal state, see Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 485 (2004). 
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of legitimacy. Instead, they are simply presumed to frame the legitimacy of a 
constitutional project. The third prong of Michelman’s argument is the most ambitious. 
Departing from the concept of constitutional authorship, Michelman proposes a 
“presentist” alternative to contemporary theories of constitutional legitimacy in his 2003 
essay Ida’s Way.11 Is the version of constitutional legitimacy that he propounds, in this 
series of essays, as presentist as he claims? Does it succeed in justifying constitutional 
theories in the face of the transtemporal nature of constitutional authorship? Whether 
Michelman has managed, at last, to cut the Gordian knot of constitutional-legitimacy 
theories is the question this article seeks to answer. 
Tracking Michelman’s theoretical odyssey as he engages various attempts to 
solve the legitimacy conundrum, this article argues that Michelman’s assertion that a 
transtemporal concept of constitutional authorship lies at the heart of existing theories of 
constitutional legitimacy is, indeed, correct. However, the argument will be made that he 
has not managed in “Ida’s way” to come up with a concept of legitimacy that does not 
itself hinge on such a concept. “Ida’s way” offers a presentist, all-things-considered 
analysis that fails to account for the continued prevalence of a particular 
institution—namely, judicial review, retained at the heart of Michelman’s alternative 
theory of constitutional legitimacy—as the authoritative mechanism for settling disputes. 
This failure serves, albeit indirectly, to substantiate the centrality of constitutional 
authorship in our thinking about the rule of law.  
                                                
11 Michelman, Ida’s Way, supra note 10. See also Michelman, Reply, supra note 10. 
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Section 1 paraphrases Michelman’s diagnosis of contract-based and 
acceptance-oriented theories of constitutional legitimacy, showing why both theoretical 
positions on constitutional legitimacy remain embedded in the idea of constitutional 
authorship one way or another. Section 2 illuminates the transtemporal character of 
constitutional authorship. Section 3 introduces Michelman’s presentist alternative theory 
of constitutional legitimacy, and Section 4 argues that his presentist, 
all-things-considered theory of constitutional legitimacy remains rooted in the idea of 
constitutional authorship. The fifth section is a summary of the argument. 
 
1. Beyond contract and acceptance: Michelman on legitimacy 
According to Michelman, the content-based point of view is exemplified by John 
Rawls’s theory of justice, which builds on the liberal political tradition of social 
contract.12 Contractarians argue that “the constitution is binding if and only if it says 
what a constitution, now, needs to say . . . if it is to be capable of bestowing 
respect-worthiness on political acts taken in conformity to it.”13 To function as a 
“legitimacy contract” that makes the entire legal system worthy of respect, the 
constitution must include only certain content that grounds its moral bindingness.14 The 
respect-worthiness of a constitution is contingent on whether citizens judge its contents 
                                                
12 John Rawls has been the protagonist of Michelman’s discussion on the issue of the legitimacy of 
constitutional democracy. See supra note 10. In addition, Michelman’s list of constitutional 
contractarians includes Jürgen Habermas, Charles Larmore, and himself as well. See Michelman, 
Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 113, 134 n.3. 
13 Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation, supra note 10, at 9. 
14 See Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 117–118. 
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to be capable of bestowing validity. This is why a legitimacy theory founded on the 
tradition of a social contract is content-based.15 
Michelman observes that this contractarian view of constitutional legitimacy 
falters when faced with ethical pluralism, both as a conceptual position and as an 
empirical situation. He suggests that Rawls did not take his own starting 
point—reasonable pluralism—to its logical limit. Rather, Rawls based his contractarian 
view on a poorly thought-out preconception embedded in Western liberal democratic 
societies. Moreover, to the extent that there is reasonable disagreement on value choices 
in every aspect of today’s social life, it is unlikely, if not impossible, that individuals 
charged with burdens of judgment on the essential contents of a constitution will reach 
consensus.16  
Michelman also identifies the problem of interpretive disagreements regarding a 
constitution,17 which this article calls the second order of reasonable disagreement. The 
first order occurs when a draft constitution is under discussion and poses a challenge to 
contractarianism that is more empirical than conceptual. In contrast, the second order of 
reasonable disagreement arises after an original constitutional consensus has been 
forged. It is concerned with the following key issue: even if the contents essential to 
securing a sufficiently legitimated constitutional agreement—what Michelman calls 
                                                
15 Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 336–342 (Yale Univ. Press 1980).  
16 See Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation, supra note 10, at 10–12; Michelman, Ida’s Way, supra 
note 10, at 352; Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 122–123; Michelman, Judicial 
Supremacy, supra note 10, at 586–587; Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 
118–23; Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 88–89; Michelman, Deliberative 
Democracy, supra note 10, at 165.  
17 See generally Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10. 
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“constitutional essentials”—are agreed to,18 the practice of constitutional interpretation 
could lead to the collapse of the dualist conceptual architecture of the content-based 
view of constitutional legitimacy, an architecture in which the distinction between the 
constitution and the body of nonconstitutional ordinary law is assumed.19  
In the practice of constitutional adjudication, interpretation is necessary to bridge 
the inherent gap between norms and their application.20  For example, while the 
normative principle of equal protection is enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, whether affirmative action gives effect to the principle, or violates it, 
is a matter of interpretation. The content and meaning of constitutional essentials are 
subject to debate among those who adopt varying interpretive attitudes. 21  Thus, 
postconstituent interpreters of the constitution are challenged to reach consensus when 
the second order of reasonable disagreement arises.22 
The implication of the “re-making” of a constitution by means of constitutional 
interpretation is that the constitution itself becomes incomplete and unstable. According 
to Michelman, at the core of constitutional legitimacy is the idea that the constitution 
should be capable of completely resolving all issues on the basis of the essentials that 
have been agreed upon during the framing of the text.23 If interpretation is inevitable, 
then everything written in the constitution is potentially open to future redefinition. 
                                                
18  See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 65 (listing the plan of political 
government and the list of personal rights and liberties as constitutional essentials). 
19 See Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation, supra note 10, at 9. 
20 See Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 118–120. 
21 See also Jiří Přibáň, The Time of Constitution-Making: On the Differentiation of the Legal, Political 
and Moral Systems and Temporality of Constitutional Symbolism, 19 RATIO JURIS 456, 475 (2006). 
22 See Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation, supra note 10, at 11–12.  
23 See Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 120–121. 
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Further, if such is the case, then the constitution is in a state of constant uncertainty,24 
and it becomes impracticable to assess the respect-worthiness of other public acts in light 
of agreed-upon constitutional essentials. Rather, every instance of constitutional 
interpretation effectively casts the respect-worthiness of the constitution itself into 
question, thereby obliterating the distinction between the constitution and ordinary law 
and undermining the premise of constitutional legitimacy.25 
Thus, the practice of constitutional interpretation means that the supposed 
consensus on constitutional essentials is, at best, temporary and, at worst, nominal.26 
Whatever is resolved in the drafting process merely defers the issue of constitutional 
bindingness rather than settling it. This susceptibility of constitutional essentials to 
redefinition is at odds with the contractarian content-based view of legitimacy.27 
Michelman proceeds to address another strain of the liberal political position on 
legitimacy within the broad social-contract tradition, namely, Jürgen Habermas’s 
proceduralism.28 He asserts that Habermas’s proceduralist theory of the legitimacy of 
constitutional democracy boils down to the following propositions: (a) “For a norm to be 
valid, the consequences and side effects that its general observance can be expected to 
have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each person affected must be such 
that all can accept [it] freely”; and (b) “[O]nly those norms of action are valid to which 
                                                
24 See Balkin, supra note 10, at 488. 
25 See Michelman, Constitutional Patriotism, supra note 10, at 1023. 
26 See id. 
27 See Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 120–123. 
28 See Michelman, Constitutional Patriotism, supra note 10, at 1023–1028 (including Habermas in “the 
practitioners of constitutional contractarian justification”); Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra 
note 10, at 132 (noting the contractarian character of Habermasian proceduralism). See also ANDREAS 
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all possible affected persons could assent as participants in rational discourse.”29 
Michelman observes that this position, while ostensibly proceduralist in nature, still 
“characterizes political justification in terms of hypothetical universal agreement.”30 
Furthermore, says Michelman, “hypothetical consent based on correct reasoning is a 
substantive, not a procedural test for the justified character of a set of fundamental 
laws.” 31  To conclude, “Habermas has no [proceduralist] argument yet for the 
requirement of an actual democratic-procedural provenance for a set of fundamental 
laws.” 32  In sum, if Habermasian proceduralism is actually content-based, then 
proceduralism will face the same challenges that second-order reasonable disagreement 
poses to the Rawlsian strain of contractarianism. 
In the process of exploring Habermas’s proceduralism, as a successful alternative 
account of constitutional legitimacy, Michelman paraphrases it, relating it to the moral 
supportability of the political regime conceived in the constitution. With respect to the 
legitimacy of constitutional democracy, he distinguishes between the constitutional 
regime’s justice-seeking capacity and its moral supportability.33 This distinction results 
from two different conceptions of the objectives of constitutional democracy: the first 
conceives of the constitution as an instrument for seeking justice,34 while the second 
focuses on “the moral justifiability of supporting the [existing] coercive regime” as an 
                                                                                                                                           
KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND 
HANNAH ARENDT 249 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
29 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 87 (citation omitted). 
30 Id. at 88. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 88 (emphasis in original). 
33 See id. at 85, 88. 
34 See also PREUSS, supra note 6, at 25–37. 
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effective mechanism for maintaining a peaceful social order.35 Michelman maintains 
that, inevitably, if the constitution’s legitimacy is conceived of in terms of its 
justice-seeking capacity, this would impinge on the substantive issue of justice, that is, 
the content of constitutional essentials. In this view, Habermas’s proceduralism remains 
substantive. However, the moral justifiability of an existing coercive regime can be 
enhanced when the regime includes “an influential process of truly democratic critical 
reexamination that is fully receptive to everyone’s perceptions of situation and interests 
and, relatedly, everyone’s opinion about justice.”36 Such a process, one in which all 
concerned are free and equally able to make their own judgment as to the moral 
supportability of coercive government measures, certainly might involve citizens more 
closely in the constitutional regime under which they live. This arrangement could 
bolster the legitimacy of the existing system; thus, the procedure itself—not content or 
substance—delivers a “legitimacy surplus” to the existing constitutional regime. 
For the sake of argument, Michelman argues that reframing Habermas’s 
proceduralism this way would shed light on whether proceduralism truly distinguishes 
itself from content-based contractarianism as a way of conceiving the legitimacy of 
constitutional democracy. However, as Michelman observes, even in terms of moral 
supportability, the validity-bestowing capacity of Habermas’s proceduralism is not 
unconditional. It turns on the nature and practices of the “influential process of truly 
democratic critical re-examination,” which “may itself at any time become a matter of 
                                                
35 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 88. See also Michelman, Reply, supra note 10, 
at 657. 
36 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 90. 
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contentious but reasonable disagreement.”37 “Arguing thus,” he says, proceduralists face 
two alternatives: 
1) the obligation to justify, on substantive moral grounds, any claim that 
normative legitimation flows from the visible operation of any particular, 
empirically given, positive-legally constituted process we may be pleased to call 
”democracy”; or, 2) the impossibility of a publicly reasoned demonstration that 
the laws by which the supposedly legitimating process is constituted really are a 
fulfillment of the “democracy” that is capable of conferring respect-worthiness 
on a regime.38  
 
Choosing the first option would drive proceduralists back to their point of 
departure, embroiling them in all the challenges of reasonable disagreement that their 
Rawlsian, content-based counterparts have failed to resolve. Alternatively, they would 
accept the existing political regime without justification and resign themselves to the 
impossibility of legitimacy. Is this the end of Habermas’s proceduralist answer to the 
questions regarding the legitimacy of constitutional democracy? Not quite. 
Michelman notes that, to escape the dilemma, Habermas turns to the idea of 
reflexivity. Subjecting the discursive process at the center of proceduralism to discursive 
reflection, Habermas argues, “[t]he idea of the rule of law sets in motion a spiraling 
                                                
37 See id. at 91. But see KALYVAS, supra note 28, at 241–253 (asserting that symmetry, autonomy, 
solidarity, equality, mutuality, and inclusiveness are implicit in democratic procedures and independent 
of substantive values). 
38 Michelman, Human Rights, supra note 10, at 75. 
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self-application of law.”39 In other words, the “influential process of truly democratic 
critical re-examination” must itself be the object of the “influential process of truly 
democratic critical re-examination.”40 The problem, as Michelman points out, is that 
this reflexivity evokes “an infinite regress of validity claims” because in the process of 
reflexivity the validity-bestowing attribute itself is subjected to an endless spiral of 
debate.41 To resolve the concern about an infinite regress of validity claims, Habermas 
articulates the principle of reflexive democracy as follows: “The citizens 
themselves . . . decide how they must fashion the rights that give the discourse principle 
legal shape as a principle of democracy [once they] make an originary use of a civic 
autonomy that thereby constitutes itself in a performatively self-referential manner.”42 
For Michelman, Habermas’s last push to save proceduralism—as a solution to 
the legitimacy of constitutional democracy—from the challenges facing contractarianism 
and from degeneration into infinite regress does not succeed. As for Habermas’s 
assertion of the performatively self-referential constitution of reflexive democracy, 
Michelman states bluntly: “[A]n originary use of a civic autonomy” [is evocative of the] 
founding act of citizens’ authorship [in the] ‘originary’ constitutive moment.”43 It turns 
out that Habermas plays down his proceduralist foundation by basing his proceduralist 
                                                
39 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY 39 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). 
40 See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 90. 
41 See id. at 91. 
42 HABERMAS, supra note 39, at 74, 128. See also Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, 
at 91. 
43 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 91. See also Michelman, Constitutional 
Patriotism, supra note 10, at 1026–1028. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A 
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 775 (2001) (“[W]ith this 
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contractarianism and reflexive democracy on the idea of constitutional authorship rather 
than on proceduralism itself.44 
Taken as a whole, Michelman argues, the fair procedures at the core of 
proceduralism turn out to be “very much a matter of what we . . . call substance,” if they 
are to be divorced from a presumed authorship and based simply on the Habermasian 
discourse ideal and without being plunged into infinite regress.45 The proceduralist turn 
neither solves the problem of ethical pluralism nor bridges the gap between norms and 
applications. Rather, it returns to its point of departure: Rawlsian content-based 
contractarianism. Thus, both the content-based and procedure-based strains of 
contractualism fail to establish the respect-worthiness of the constitution. 
The second attitude toward constitutional legitimacy that Michelman considers is 
an acceptance-based, legal nonvolitionalism,46 characterized by the proposition that “the 
foundations of legal orders are and can only be organically grown facts of social 
practice, as distinguished from acts or expressions of anyone’s will.”47 According to 
Michelman, legal nonvolitionalists regard a legal system as “an effectively regulative 
social practice of reference to an identifiable collection or system of norms.”48 Whether 
                                                                                                                                           
[concrete] act [of founding for the political community] the grounds for a world-historically new practice 
have been established”). 
44 Cf. HABERMAS, supra note 39, at 120. The role of reflexivity in constitutional authorship will be further 
explored infra Section 3. 
45 See Michelman, Constitutional Patriotism, supra note 10, at 1027–1028 (emphasis added). See also 
Balkin, supra note 10, at 489. 
46 See Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126; Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, 
supra note 10, at 68–74. 
47 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 69. 
48  See Frank I. Michelman, Can Constitutional Democrats Be Legal Positivists? Or Why 
Constitutionalism?, 2 CONSTELLATIONS 293, 293 (1996) [hereinafter Michelman, Why 
Constitutionalism]. According to this view of legal nonvolitionalism, Michelman names Frederick 
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the moral status of the legal order has any bearing on its acceptance is of no concern to 
them. Thus, in contrast to the contractarian model, the acceptance-based, nonvolitionalist 
conception of constitutional legitimacy is content-independent in the sense that neither 
consent nor the object of consent bears on the legitimacy of the constitution itself. 
From the nonvolitionalist perspective, the fact of acceptance itself establishes the 
constitution’s respect-worthiness.49 Michelman observes that legal positivism—evoking 
H. L. A. Hart’s dichotomy of primary and secondary rules—argues that there exists an 
“ultimate” rule of recognition among the secondary rules, controlling “which purported 
determinations of primary normative contents, uttered by whom, in what forms and 
circumstances, are to be respected and given respect.”50 Following this line of thought, 
nonvolitionalists, as distinguished from Kelsenian positivists, further argue that the 
ultimate rule of recognition must reside outside the legal system and thus it “cannot itself 
consist in the command of any sovereign.”51 The nonvolitionalist version of the ultimate 
rule of recognition is not a norm but, rather, an overdetermined social fact.52 While the 
secondary rules that govern the process of lawmaking are purportedly stipulated in the 
                                                                                                                                           
Schauer, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart as nonvolitionalists. See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, 
supra note 10, at 94 n.21. 
49  See Michelman, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 10, at 116; Michelman, Constitutional 
Authorship, supra note 10, at 69, 88. This actual acceptance stands in contrast to the hypothetical as well 
as actual consent based on the acceptability of normative substance. See Michelman, Contract for 
Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126. 
50 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 69–70. 
51 See id. at 70. Here is what distinguishes between the two most influential legal positivists in the 
twentieth century: H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions 
of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 145, 148–152 (Sanford Levinson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1995). 
52 See Schauer, supra note 51, at 149–150. Frederick Schauer further points out, “In referring to the 
ultimate rule of recognition as a rule, Hart has probably misled us.” Id. at 150 (emphasis in original). 
Following Brian Simpson, Schauer suggests thinking of the ultimate rule of recognition as a practice. 
See id. at 150–151 (emphasis in original). 
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constitution,53 that which bestows legitimacy and controlling power on the constitution 
is itself an extralegal fact.54 Take the United States Constitution as an example: in the 
legal nonvolitionalist perspective, its legitimacy rests on “the fact of [the American 
public’s] social acceptance of the Constitution as the supreme law” instead of on “the 
acceptance of someone’s entitlement to make the Constitution be supreme law by 
legislating it as such.”55 
By attributing the legitimacy of the constitution to organically grown facts of 
social practice, nonvolitionalists seem to solve the challenges facing contractarians. The 
failure to agree on the essential contents of the constitution as a legitimacy contract 
poses no challenge to their vision of constitutional legitimacy. For legal 
nonvolitionalists, the social awareness that a society is, in fact, governed by a 
constitution suffices to lay the groundwork for the acceptance-based theory of the 
legitimacy of constitutional democracy. Legal nonvolitionalism as a legitimacy theory is 
rendered free of the thorny challenges facing contractarianism by excluding the fact of 
ethical pluralism from its theoretical purview and by reducing the facts of social practice 
to a single question: Is the constitution socially accepted?56  
Regardless of its ostensible perfection, Michelman finds a weakness in the 
nonvolitionalist strategy. Legal nonvolitionalism seeks to banish the fact of ethical 
pluralism, together with the accompanying issues concerning constitutional 
completeness, to the extralegal area of empirical contingency. Issues connected with 
                                                
53 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I § 7. 
54 See Schauer, supra note 51, at 156–157, 160–161. 
55 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 70 (emphasis omitted). 
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ethical pluralism are the objects of empirical investigation rather than that of normative 
analysis. 57  Nevertheless, acceptance-oriented nonvolitionalists cannot avoid the 
question that has been placed in the field of empirical contingency: Why does “a critical 
mass of the country’s inhabitants . . . intersubjectively concede a regulative force to an 
actually operative practice of government that these inhabitants . . . tend to identify with 
(or hypostatize as) a textoid that they call ‘the Constitution’?”58 
Once framed thus, the acceptance-based nonvolitionalist model faces a serious 
“identity” crisis. By extending its query to those issues relegated to the extralegal field of 
empirical contingency, legal nonvolitionalism turns out to be a mere theoretical façade. 
To answer the question of how the constitution is socially accepted, one needs “[f]ull 
knowledge of a social practice of referring questions of legal validity to [the system’s 
own ultimate standards of legal validation].”59 The required knowledge includes “how 
participants in the practice experience it, ‘from the inside.’”60 Their experience may 
have little to do with the nonvolitionalist conception of legitimacy, however.  
Take the United States constitutional order. Michelman stresses, “We should be 
clear . . . that the legal nonvolitionalist argument, cogent as it is, in no way impugns [the 
proposition] that Americans do in fact recurrently think of the Constitution as containing 
the ultimate legal grounding . . . and, furthermore, as doing so by virtue of its legislated 
                                                                                                                                           
56 See id.  
57 See id. at 71. 
58 See id. at 73. 
59 See id. at 71–73. 
60 See id. at 73. 
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character.” 61  Specifically, in terms of American constitutional jurisprudence and 
culture,62 Michelman finds that one of the features of the social practice to which 
acceptance-based constitutional theories attribute legitimacy suggests something that 
would contradict legal nonvolitionalism: “participants refer all questions about legal 
authority and validity to sets of standards to which . . . they attribute the character of 
having been intentionally legislated.”63 While such attribution is a social practice, what 
matters to the legitimacy of the constitutional order is what the attribution entails. The 
United States Constitution derives its authority from the fact that it is the work of a 
special legislative author. In other words, “[t]he legal nonvolitionalist argument . . . does 
not preclude but rather sharpens the position that we trace the Constitution’s bindingness 
on us at least partly to its reputation-as-legislated.”64 Moreover, Michelman notes, “[i]n 
the face of an apparently cogent refutation of any essential tie between the legal force of 
a country’s constitution and attribution of its authorship, we persist in tying our 
constitution’s authority for us . . . to attributions of its authorship.” 65  Thus, 
acceptance-based legal nonvolitionalism amounts to another content-independent 
                                                
61 Id. at 73 (emphasis omitted). 
62  Although Michelman builds on American constitutional jurisprudence, Larry Alexander, in his 
characterization of Michelman’s account of the “authority-authorship syndrome,” notes that no 
constitutional regime can escape it. See Larry Alexander, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 1, 6. See also Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional 
Powermaking of the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations between Constituent Power and 
the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 143,143–144 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., Duke Univ. Press 1994) (noting the prevalence and 
significance of the grounding of the constitution in men’s will in the constitutional tradition of the 
European continent). 
63 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 73 (emphasis added).  
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 73–74. 
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concept—the idea of constitutional authorship—at least in the constitutional regime and 
culture of the United States.66 
 
2. Michelman’s engagement with authorship 
Constitutional authorship—or, simply, authorship—lies at the center of the third 
conventional approach to legitimacy described by Michelman. He establishes the 
concept of constitutional authorship by asking: “Does the statement [‘The United States 
has a good constitution’] . . . carry praise of any agent for making our constitution a 
good one?”67 “[I]t does,” Michelman claims, “because we incorrigibly think of good 
constitutional charters or regimes not as blessings that luckily befall us as strength and 
health befall [an] animal, but as designed creations by responsible human authors and as 
laws . . . whose expressly legislated character is a part, at least, of what gives them their 
claim on our allegiance and support.”68 Michelman adds, “For us (for you), . . . a 
political-institutional constitution has always . . . the character of a law expressly and 
designedly laid down by politically circumstanced human agents, which gains its 
bindingness on us at least in part by force of its reputed intentionality as a product of 
their express political exertion.” 69  Essentially, the author-based conception of 
constitutional legitimacy holds that “we owe respect to a constitution having 
                                                
66 The transmutation of the acceptance-based conception of constitutional bindingness to the author-based 
conception is not peculiar to the United States. It also exists, for example, in German constitutional 
jurisprudence. See generally Gerhard Casper, The “Karlsruhe Republic:” Keynote Address at the State 
Ceremony Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 GERMAN L.J. No. 18, 
Dec. 1, 2001, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=111. 
67 See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 65. 
68 Id. 
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such-and-such prescriptive content just because of who that constitution’s authors 
were.”70 This is what Michelman calls “the authority-authorship syndrome.”71 
Michelman regards the author-based conception that “[t]he Constitution . . . is an 
enacted law, a piece of legislation, the intentional production of a political will” as the 
“sheerest banality,” “a common vernacular notion that cannot withstand critical 
examination.”72 Nonetheless, he concedes that the authorial view of constitutional 
legitimacy is “inevitable.” 73  The implications of inevitable banality or banal 
inevitability pose questions to Michelman’s readers: Do they suggest that belief in the 
legitimacy of the United States constitutional order is the result of a self-congratulatory, 
unexamined political cliché? Or, does the inevitability of the appeal to authorship 
indicate that something crucial to the whole idea of constitutional legitimacy is clouded 
by the label of “banality”?74 
Michelman answers these questions with a strictly modern sensibility; it is 
simply unimaginable, to us, in this day and age, for a constitution to be no more than 
“blessings that luckily befall us as strength and health befall [an] animal.”75 At the core 
of the modern sensibility is the belief that we are rational and reasonable; we make 
critical judgments, creating the difference between experience and expectation. Based on 
                                                                                                                                           
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126. See also WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE 
INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 189 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993). 
71 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 67. 
72 See id. at 64. 
73 See id. See also Alexander, supra note 62, at 6; Bert van Roermund, Sovereignty: Unpopular and 
Popular, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 33, 47–48 (Neil Walker ed., Hart 2003). 
74 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 64. 
75 Id. at 65. 
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our critical view of what we have experienced, we project our ideals into the future.76 
Insofar as the constitution is “a legally binding blueprint for constructing a rational 
society,”77 it epitomizes “[the] modern social experience of the future as something 
designed.” 78  This explains the deficiency of the acceptance-based concept of 
constitutional legitimacy; it leaves out the question of the participants’ consciousness in 
the process of legal evolution. Attachment to constitutional authorship reflects the 
prominence of human agency in modern society.79 
At the center of constitutional authorship is the idea that the legitimacy of the 
constitution is built on the nature of the relationship between us, who live under a 
constitutional regime, and the authors of that regime. According to Michelman, the 
we-they relationship is more than one of mere association. It is a relationship of 
“allegiance,” in which “you and I might consider ourselves and the country bound to [the 
authors’] word by communal ties.”80 Addressing whether this allegiance is in harmony 
with his modernist, critical philosophical-anthropological view of rational agency,81 he 
recalls his observation (which this article calls his “incorrigibility proposition”) that “we 
incorrigibly think of good constitutional charters . . . as laws . . . whose expressly 
                                                
76 See REINHART KOSELLECK, THE PRACTICE OF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY: TIMING HISTORY, SPACING 
CONCEPTS 45–147 (Todd Samuel Presner et al. trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2002). 
77 PREUSS, supra note 6, at 31. 
78 Přibáň, supra note 21, at 472. 
79 This attachment to constitutional authorship may turn out, arguably, to be to the actual design of the 
constitutional architecture rather than to the agency of constitutional architects. Still, situated in the 
presumed modern sensibility that Michelman identifies, it must trace back to the agency from which the 
actual design originates. This is what differentiates constitutional authorship from legal nonvolitionalism 
in terms of the legitimacy of constitutional democracy. The author owes this distinction to Paul Kahn’s 
critical interrogation. 
80 See Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126. 
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legislated character is a part, at least, of what gives them their claim on our allegiance 
and support.”82 
Michelman elaborates on the “we” that features as the subject in the 
“incorrigibility proposition,” which he sees as the key to constitutional authorship. The 
“we” is not merely a pronoun or a syntactic element but, instead, according to 
Michelman, refers to us—We the Observant Citizen-Readers—including all those 
reading his Constitutional Authorship at present as well as in the past or future.83 We the 
citizen-readers are urged to ask ourselves: What is the relationship between us and the 
authors of the constitution that makes us owe allegiance to their opus?84 The answer, 
Michelman holds, is that the allegiance is based on who the constitutional authors are, 
not on what they have authored. Thus, in order to conceive of a relationship of allegiance 
based on the identity of the constitution’s authors rather than on its contents and, at the 
same time, to take seriously the “burden of judgment” concerning the legitimacy of the 
constitutional order, the author-based conception of legitimacy centers on the conceit 
that we, the observant citizen-readers, are “identical” with those constitutional authors. 
Yet, the question is: How is it possible for us to identify with these authors given 
Michelman’s critical, individualist philosophical-anthropological point of view? 
                                                                                                                                           
81  See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 87. On this individualist 
philosophical-anthropological view, the legitimacy question poses a “burden[] of judgment” on every 
citizen. See id. at 88–89. 
82 Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
83 See id. 
84 Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: Marbury v. Madison AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 
184 (Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
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This question lies at the heart of theories regarding the rule of law as 
self-government, epitomized by Rousseau’s concept of “general will.”85 In explaining 
the general character of the law, Rousseau wrote, “[w]hen the people as a whole makes 
rules for the people as a whole, it is dealing only with itself; and if any relationship 
emerges, it is between the entire body seen from one perspective and the same entire 
body seen from another, without any division whatever.”86 Rousseau employs the 
notion of general will to link the one (the ruler) to the many (the ruled), making possible 
the idea of the rule of law as self-government.87  
To Michelman, however, the idea of general will does not shed much light on 
how the collective sense of “we” or the construct of “we” would emerge. Rather, it 
sounds like “a romantic dream of universal participation.”88 To implement universal 
participation, plebiscites are generally considered to be the institutional replacement of 
representative democracy. Specifically, a plebiscite asking the electorate to say “yes” or 
“no” by vote is perceived as the modern substitute for the acclamation of the people 
assembled in a stadium or on the street. On those ideal occasions, when the ruler acts in 
accordance with “the consent or disapproval by a simple calling” from the assembled 
masses, the acclaimed ruler and the acclaiming ruled are seen to become practically 
identical.89 Thus, when put into action, the ethereal idea of general will does not always 
                                                
85 See also Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677, 2690 
(2003). 
86 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 81 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin 1968) (1762). 
87 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 86, at 81–83. 
88 van Roermund, supra note 73, at 42. 
89 See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 131–135, 272–279 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke 
Univ. Press 2008) (1928). See also CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 16–17 
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connote democracy or self-government. In fact, a vision of plebiscitary democratic 
dictatorship finds its inspiration in Rousseau.90 Worse still, in the early 1930s, Carl 
Schmitt even fancied the Führer’s pronouncement of the law in a racially homogeneous 
society to be the realization of the dream of “actual identity between the ruler and the 
ruled.”91 Taken together, once understood as actual sameness, identification between 
ruler and ruled can be imagined to exist only in the instantaneous “immanence” in which 
the ruler speaks his will into law, while the ruled mass acclaims his pronouncements.92  
In view of these historical lessons, is Rousseau’s proposition that “the people as a 
whole makes the rule for the people as a whole” merely a tragic myth? Or, is there any 
way to make sense of this Rousseauian fable? To what does the identity between the 
ruler and the ruled point other than actual sameness? While Michelman does not explore 
these issues, his “incorrigibility proposition” suggests the conceptual structure within 
                                                                                                                                           
(Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 1985). For a critique of Schmitt’s idea of democracy by acclamation, 
see HABERMAS, supra note 39, at 184–185. 
90  See Melvin Richter, Toward a Concept of Political Illegitimacy: Bonapartist Dictatorship and 
Democratic Legitimacy, 10 POL. THEORY 185 (1982); William Henry Chamberlin, The Jacobin Ancestry 
of Soviet Communism, 17 RUSSIAN REV. 251 (1958). 
91 See CARL SCHMITT, State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of Political Unity, in STATE, 
MOVEMENT, PEOPLE: THE TRIADIC STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL UNITY (INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF 
LEGALITY) 3–54 (Simona Draghici trans., Plutarch 2001) (1933). This does not mean that Rousseau’s 
theory leads to Hitler’s rise to power. Nor does it mean that Hitler’s Nazi regime is the culmination of 
Rousseau’s general will. The point here is that Rousseau’s mysterious general will is open to 
dictatorship, even totalitarianism, although dictatorship may be embodied by President Lincoln instead 
of Robespierre or Hitler. Compare Eric Lott, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Abraham Lincoln: 
Revolutionary Rhetoric and the Emergence of Bourgeois State, 22 CLIO 157 (1993) (discussing 
President Lincoln as the embodiment of democratic dictatorship in Rousseau’s theory), with Richard 
Brookhiser, Springtime for Rousseau, in THE LONGEST NIGHT: POLEMICS AND PERSPECTIVES ON 
ELECTION 2000, at 250 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld eds., Univ. of California Press 2002) 
(noting the link between Rousseau and Hitler). See also CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 224–230 (Transaction ed. 2002) 
(1948) (discussing the “Lincoln Dictatorship”). The author thanks Paul Kahn for bringing the role of 
President Lincoln as a democratic dictator to his attention. 
92 Cf. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 30, 49 
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
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which the Rousseauian proposition would operate. Explaining the former, Michelman 
emphasizes, “I use [we] to refer to whoever reading this will admit to thinking . . . in the 
ways I am here beginning to map, my use of it thus representing my bet that you[,] 
Reader, are one of the party [who attributes the constitution to an author].”93 The fact 
that Michelman is so confident that the “we” in his “incorrigibility proposition” emerges 
when readers engage with the text—and stands not only “for us” but also “for you”94— 
suggests an understanding of identity as constructive reflexivity instead of actual 
sameness.95 
To illustrate the difference between actual sameness and constructive reflexivity 
with regard to the construction of identity, let us focus, first, on the situation of the 
first-person singular. Understood as actual sameness, the identity of the first-person 
singular centers on the question “What am I?”96 Individuals that can be observed 
objectively define the identity of the first-person singular. In contrast, in terms of 
constructive reflexivity, the central question about the identity of the first-person 
singular is “Who am I?”97 This question cannot be answered ostensibly, by pointing to 
objective characteristics. Instead, we can only get a sense of “who I am” by entering into 
an inner dialogue between the different selves in various aspects of personal life and by 
                                                
93 Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 65 (emphasis added). 
94 See id. 
95 These two distinct understandings of identity are derived from the distinction that Paul Ricoeur made 
between idem and ipse. See PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, FORGETTING 80–82 (Kathleen Blamey 
& David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2004). See also van Roermund, supra note 73, at 42; 
Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in 
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 9, 14–17 
(Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
96 See Lindahl, supra note 95, at 14. 
97 See id. 
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embarking on the process of narrating personal experiences with which we map out the 
identity of the first-person singular.98 For example, a clone is identical to its original in 
terms of objective features and perhaps subjective dispositions as well, but still they may 
tell different personal stories.99 
Bearing in mind the distinction between these two meanings of identity, let us 
move, now, to the situation of the first-person plural “we.” Given that individuals are not 
identical in nature, it would be unintelligible to understand the identity of the first-person 
plural as actual sameness unless this “we” is narrowed and understood as the sense of 
collectivity that results from those exceptional, transitory moments in which a single 
voice speaks out not because personal identities are forcefully suppressed but because 
they are temporarily forgotten in the moment of immanence.100 Thus, the identity of the 
first-person plural “we” cannot be made sense of by generalizing the common 
characteristics of the individuals who partake of the first-person plural “we.” Rather, it is 
constructed around a common “project” that individuals share with one another.101 
While this shared project may be traced to particular minds,102 to hold individuals 
                                                
98 See, e.g., TZVETAN TODOROV, THE POETICS OF PROSE 74 (Richard Howard trans., Cornell Univ. Press 
1977) (“narrative equals life; absence of narrative, death”). Essayist and literature scholar Reynolds 
Price suggests that since time immemorial, stories have been concerned with “arrang[ing] the evidence 
of daily life into sequential, even causal patterns implying order.” REYNOLDS PRICE, A PALPABLE GOD: 
THIRTY STORIES TRANSLATED FROM THE BIBLE WITH AN ESSAY ON THE ORIGINS AND LIFE OF 
NARRATIVE 26 (Atheneum 1978). See also Gerald J. Postema, Melody and Law’s Mindfulness of Time, 
17 RATIO JURIS 203, 211 (2004). 
99 See generally Søren Holm, A Life in the Shadow: One Reason Why We Should Not Clone Humans?, 7 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 160 (1998). 
100 See SCHMITT, supra note 92, at 49. Cf. Emilos Christodoulis, Against Substitution: The Constitutional 
Thinking of Dissensus, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 95, at 189, 195–97, 202. 
101 See Lindahl, supra note 95, at 15. 
102 This is “the performative element” in any invocation of “we.” See Christodoulis, supra note 100, at 
202. 
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together as a first-person plural “we,” it needs to be open to deliberation and reflection 
among the individuals involved.103 If the particular project is forced on individuals, it 
may still succeed in bundling them together, but it falls short of bringing about a sense of 
collective identity. For this reason, the common project at the heart of the identity of the 
first-person plural “we” is similar to the personal story central to the question “Who am 
I?”104 This project, constituting the identity of the first-person plural “we,” is to be 
narrated and codetermined through the dialogues that take place among the component 
individuals of the “we.”105 
The reflexive relationship shared by individual participants, when involved in a 
mutual constitutional project, is the conceptual structure in which Michelman uses “we” 
in his “incorrigibility proposition.” Engaged in the shared activity of making sense of his 
“incorrigibility proposition,” readers join the author, Michelman himself, in a dialogue 
around the idea of “an incorrigible constitution.”106 It is through this dialogic reflection 
that the collective identity of “we,” in the sense of constructive reflexivity, emerges in 
                                                
103 See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe, in THE 
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 95, 
at 211, 215–216. See also Postema, supra note 98, at 209–213. 
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Michelman’s “incorrigibility proposition,” which is constitutive of us, the observant 
citizen-readers, and of them, the constitutional authors.107  
Taken together, the identification of us citizens with the constitutional authors, 
which lies at the heart of the idea of constitutional authorship and bridges the gap 
between the ruler and the ruled in Rousseau’s proposition on the general character of the 
law, is conceptually resolved by understanding identity as constructive reflexivity.108 
Moreover, at the heart of constitutional authorship is the ideal of the rule of law as 
self-government: “the people as a whole makes rules for the people as a whole.”109 
Thus, the first-person plural subject of “we” in the idea of constitutional authorship, 
which consists of us citizens and the constitutional initiator-revolutionaries, always acts 
in the name of “the people.”110 This is the conceptual matrix in which “We the People” 
grounds the concept of constitutional authorship. 
As the preceding section shows, in the final analysis, both constitutional 
contractarianism and legal nonvolitionalism must be grounded, one way or another, in 
some form of constitutional authorship. Understood as constructive reflexivity, the idea 
of constitutional authorship and the identity of “We the People” can be inferred from 
Michelman’s critical, philosophical-anthropological view of rational agency and without 
reducing constitutional authorship to democratic dictatorship as history has suggested. 
                                                
107 See Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 10, at 65. 
108 Rousseau himself suggested a reflexivity reading of the Rousseauian proposition, which he left 
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The inclusiveness implied by the reflexive construction of the first-person plural 
authorship of “we” and the emphasis on human agency seem to explain why 
enchantment with constitutional authorship is “inevitable.” 111  It remains unclear, 
however, whether Michelman would be thus enchanted. 
 
3. Michelman’s systematic proceduralism in “Ida’s way”: A presentist 
view of constitutional legitimacy 
While observing that the author-based conception of constitutional bindingness is 
gaining currency in American constitutional debates and discussions,112 Michelman 
decides, nonetheless, to distance himself from it, taking what he calls “Ida’s way,” even 
at the expense of the whole notion of the constitution as a legitimacy contract” 
underpinned by constitutional authorship. 113  He turns, instead, to the concept of 
“full-merits legitimation” of constitutional democracy. 114  Why? It is not because 
understanding constitutional authorship as a function of constructive reflexivity ignores 
the empirical issues of constitutional legitimacy, as legal nonvolitionalism attempts to 
do.115 Bruce Ackerman’s account of American political history and constitutional 
change, for example, provides empirical evidence in support of the possibility that 
                                                
111 See supra text accompanied by notes 2–9. 
112 See Michelman, Contract for Legitimacy, supra note 10, at 126–127 & n.109. 
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individuals concerned about their private interests may turn into citizens focused on 
public affairs, leading to the emergence of “We the People” as constitutional 
authorship.116 If not an empirical issue,117 what is it that sets Michelman on Ida’s 
way?118 This article contends that the view of legitimacy put forth in the latter, as well 
as in other essays, shows that he fails to escape from the enchantment of constitutional 
authorship; his journey attests, instead, to the inevitability of constitutional authorship 
and sheds light on the transtemporal character of political identity. 
Michelman identifies two positions relating to the legitimacy of constitutional 
democracy: “constitutional legitimation” and “full-merits legitimation.” 119  What 
characterizes constitutional legitimation is that the legitimacy of a particular exercise of 
political power in a constitutional democracy is translated into a question of 
constitutionality. Thus, all forms of political power under constitutional democracy are 
legitimate to the extent that they conform to the constitution.120 The constitution stands 
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as a “legitimacy contract” in constitutional democracy.121 In contrast, according to 
Michelman, “full-merits legitimation” pins the legitimacy of a disputed exercise of 
political power on “[the] direct, approving judgment [on the part of citizens] of [its] 
rightness, goodness, aptness, and prudence . . . all things considered.”122 On this view, 
the legitimacy of a particular exercise of political power relates to the functioning of the 
constitutional regime as a whole. A judgment on the legitimacy of a particular act of 
political power is a function of an all-things-considered evaluation of the total 
performance of the constitutional regime.  
Michelman distances himself from the three major theoretical strands, all of 
which center on the idea of constitutional legitimation, preferring a position of 
“full-merits legitimation.” With regard to the latter, he identifies three deviations from 
the constitutional legitimation concept. First, his theory departs from the notion that the 
legitimacy of ordinary legal acts translates as “constitutionality,” with the constitution 
serving as the “legitimacy contract” for ordinary legal acts. In contrast, “full-merits 
legitimation” is inclined toward “an all-things-considered, full-merits judgment.”123 
According to the view in “Ida’s way,” the legitimacy of constitutional democracy must 
be assessed in light of “the governmental totality” of the system in which the 
constitution operates. 124  This judgment centers on “whether [the system’s] total 
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performance is good enough, on the whole, to be accepted [by individual citizens] 
considering the practical, imaginable alternatives.”125 
Second, full-merits judgment deviates from the completeness of the constitution 
that is assumed by the concept of constitutional legitimation. To the extent that 
“judgments of constitutional bindingness [are] strictly a function of sundry full-merits 
judgments,”126 “the constitution is incomplete.”127 Rather than serving as the complete 
legitimacy contract under which ordinary statutes and their enforcement are evaluated, 
Michelman explains, “[t]he constitution [through the lens of full-merits legitimation] 
becomes as good or bad, as valid or invalid, as binding or non-binding, as worthy or 
unworthy of respect, as the entire corpus juris over which in a sense it presides but of 
which it merely is a part.”128 Thus, the constitution, or rather, the entire contents of the 
constitution, consisting of substantive stipulations as well as procedural requirements, is 
considered “an institutional framework for use in settling sundry, concrete controversies 
in the field of public policy that practically require political resolution one way or the 
other.”129 Emerging from this understanding is a procedural view of the constitution. 
Thus, to the extent that procedure means the institution by which controversies of 
morality and public policy are resolved in accordance with “a test that is abstracted or 
deflected from the most immediate and concrete issues of morality and public policy that 
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are obdurately and divisively controversial in society,” the constitution is procedural.130 
While the constitution functions as the institutional procedure through which such 
controversies are settled, it does not provide all the criteria under which acts of public 
authority are to be judged.  
The third deviation of full-merits legitimation from constitutional legitimation 
concerns Ida’s own subjectivity. Since constitutional legitimation requires that 
controversies concerning public authority be judged solely by criteria inhering in the 
constitution, constitutional interpretation becomes the pivotal activity in assessing 
constitutional legitimacy and, as a consequence, the image of an ideal judge tends to 
occupy a central position. Nevertheless, Michelman emphasizes that—through the lens 
of full-merits legitimation—Ida, who makes judgments on the total performance of the 
political system, stands in stark contrast to Dworkin’s Hercules, who is a superjudge, 
although the governmental totality may evoke Ronald Dworkin’s notion of 
“integrity.”131 Essential to the concept of legitimacy in “Ida’s way” is the idea that 
“each member of the political community is authorized to decide what [the political 
system under] the Constitution means for him or herself.”132 Specifically, Ida, “[a] 
non-official personage,” refers to any member of the political community who 
“attempt[s] to gauge the respect-worthiness of her country’s extant system of 
government in [the] total performance way.”133 From Michelman’s point of view, when 
each and every Ida is expected to be able to “accommodate the pull each reasonable 
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[co-]participant will feel, for good reason toward finding [the governmental system] 
respect-worthy,” the political institutions of constitutional democracy at issue are 
legitimate.134 
Overall, Michelman’s theory of the legitimacy of constitutionalism as practice 
centers on a “contract-independent, holistic-presentist assessment of the practice of [the 
existing constitutional regime].”135 By substituting a holistic view of the constitutional 
system or the totality of governing practice for the constitution itself, Michelman 
resolves the problem of constitutional completeness over which constitutional 
contractarianism stumbles in the face of interpretive disagreement. The focus of 
attention switches from the completeness of the constitution to the totality of the 
governmental system in practice, of which the constitution is a part. Legitimacy or 
“respect-worthiness,” he writes, “is not a fact, it is a judgment” at the present moment.136 
That judgment is located in the consciousness of the “first person,” of the “I.”137 Thus, 
“[l]egitimacy . . . is, from the standpoint of a reciprocity-minded liberal, an insuperably 
and irreducibly decentralized, personal judgment.”138 
As a corollary, the origin of a current constitutional regime is not a central 
concern of the legitimacy query; it constitutes only one part of a systematic appraisal of 
the totality of governing practice. In other words, the presentist concern centers on the 
“moral supportability” of the existing political system—that is, whether the system 
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134 See id. at 365. 
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under which Ida lives should be considered legitimate and deserving of respect and 
observance.139 Thus, the constitution, as well as the whole constitutional system, is 
regarded not as containing substantive judgments but, instead, as a functional procedure 
for settling controversies concerning public authority. Michelman sums up this presentist 
perspective of the constitutional system in practice as follows: The moral justifiability of 
supporting “the coercive operations of constitutional democracy in my country” is 
completely contingent on “my judgment that every [reasonable] person concerned has 
reason to accept the governmental system in place . . . although reasonable 
disagreements persist about whether the system in place is in all respects what justice 
requires.”140 
 
4. Toward constitutional authorship 
While the presentist first-person standpoint of the legitimacy of constitutionalism as 
practice embodies Michelman’s critical, philosophical-anthropological view of 
individual rational agency, it is also what sets him apart from the idea of constitutional 
authorship and the whole author-based concept of legitimacy. To him, the identitarian 
sense of “we” that emerges in the creation of the new constitutional project is merely “an 
empirical, contingent matter.”141 The legitimacy of the constitutional order must be a 
completely personal judgment that has no bearing on a collective “we” apart from 
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individuals. In contrast, the conceptual matrix from which the first-person-plural “we” of 
constitutional authorship emerges already presupposes “some sort of unity” in the 
formation of identity, which is not merely contingent on personal judgment.142  
While considering whether to incorporate a notion of identity in theorizing the 
legitimation of politics, Michelman considers the activity of constitutional interpretation. 
According to him, there are two alternative ways of characterizing debates over 
constitutional interpretation.143 On the one hand, they can be viewed as debates “over 
the meanings or applications of a set [of] canonical items, already securely certified as 
acceptable to everyone as reasonable, come what may in dispute over how to apply 
them.”144  
Of this view Michelman observes “a nominal constitutional essential’s rational 
acceptability to the reasonable,”145 which is “independent of what that nominal essential 
is going to turn out in practice to mean.”146 Prior to the conclusion of the interpretive 
activity, the acceptability of constitutional essentials that constitute the object of 
interpretation has been assumed without being critically judged. This suggests that 
“anyone could purport to judge that any given regime is justified, without having to wait 
forever to see how every one of a never-ending succession of interpretive disputes is 
going to be resolved.”147 
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From Michelman’s perspective, this characterization of constitutional 
interpretation rests on constitutional authorship and contradicts his 
philosophical-anthropological position. As noted above, at the center of constitutional 
authorship in the vein of constructive reflexivity is the identity of the first-person plural 
“we,” which emerges from the process of deliberations centering on the constitution or, 
rather, on the set of constitutional essentials as a common project.148 During the time 
when intentional action such as a project is prospectively oriented and temporally 
extended, an initial or ex ante moment in the development of a common project in which 
a strictly forward-looking perspective is held by all participants is conceivable. At that 
exceptional moment, to be “common,” the project is open to deliberation without 
assuming any preexisting structure that would organize the deliberations. 
Correspondingly, it is at that moment that the identity emerges on the identitarian model 
of constructive reflexivity: a first-person plural “we” materializes in the process of 
dialogue on the content and future of this “project.”149 Yet, a constitutional project is not 
only extended in time but conceived to extend down the generations. 150  Later 
generations that enter into the dialogue on the deliberative development of a 
constitutional project—part of which is constitutional interpretation—will have to walk 
the path taken by preceding generations of “We the People.”151 This does not mean that 
those who come after that initial constitutional moment or generation cannot change the 
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project’s course—only that, to partake of “We the People,” they first must address what 
was set out by their forebears.152 Emerging from this cross-generational relationship is a 
transtemporal constitutional identity. 153  Constitutional authorship is transtemporal. 
Underlying this view is Michelman’s first characterization of constitutional 
interpretation as the attempt to uncover the meaning of given constitutional provisions, 
which are assumed to be “acceptable to the reasonable.”154 The problem for Michelman 
is that this view posits acceptance as preceding the establishment of meaning; he finds 
the notion of acceptance without knowledge unacceptable. 
Alternatively, Michelman proposes that debates concerning constitutional 
interpretation may be characterized as hinging on “which of the contesting meanings or 
applications [of essential constitutional items] will render these items acceptable to 
everyone as reasonable.”155 According to his presentist, first-person, systematic view of 
constitutionalism as practice, nothing is presumed because Ida cannot make a judgment 
regarding legitimacy without “full knowledge” of the content of constitutional 
essentials.156 In contrast to the first characterization above, under the second view 
constitutional interpretation seems to Michelman to presuppose neither the 
transtemporality of a constitutional project nor the acceptability of constitutional 
essentials. To a presentist Ida, the point of undertaking constitutional interpretation is not 
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to identify the meaning of given constitutional provisions but, rather, to discover how to 
render them acceptable for application to the particular controversy she faces. Centering 
on a particular constitutional provision does not mean that that provision is already 
“acceptable to everyone as reasonable.”157 The provision at the center of interpretation 
functions merely as the horizon on which different views on a particular issue engage 
with each other. The legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole—including the 
provisions that serve as the engaging horizon—is a function of the all-things-considered 
judgment resulting from the debate over which of the competing meanings of essential 
constitutional items will be adopted by the system’s interpreting institution in order to 
“render these items acceptable to everyone as reasonable.”158 Thus, the second view of 
contentions over constitutional essentials is the one that would correspond to “Ida’s 
way.” 
Does “Ida’s way” propose a viable theoretical alternative to the 
identity-embedded concept of constitutional authorship in accounting for constitutional 
legitimacy? The answer can be illuminated by a closer look at the structure of Ida’s 
presentist, full-merits view of legitimacy. As noted above, characteristic of Ida’s 
approach to constitutional interpretation—Michelman’s second alternative—is her 
indifference to the character of the essential constitutional items.159 Instead, those 
disputed constitutional provisions are functionally reconstructed; together with the 
institutions and procedures in the constitutional system, they constitute a functional 
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mechanism in which controversies concerning public authority are settled.160 From 
Michelman’s point of view, Ida resorts to this functional mechanism not as the result of 
historical necessity but, instead, because of a contingent fact: it exists and is accessible 
to her.161 But why does a critically minded Ida, who does not accept anything without 
full knowledge of it, choose this particular existing and accessible functional institution 
over others? 
Based on what Rawls calls “Hobbes’s thesis”—to the effect that a government’s 
readiness to enforce legal ordering is the necessary condition for the production of 
“goods of union”162—Michelman acknowledges that “[a] judgment regarding legitimacy 
refers . . . to a judgment regarding stability.”163 This means not that Ida herself equates 
legitimacy with stability in forming her judgment on legitimacy164 but, rather, that her 
assumption that the existing institution is the proper functional mechanism to settle 
controversies concerning public authority arises from her inclination toward stability. 
Concern over stability is not irrational or unreasonable; however, stability alone does not 
account for Ida’s choice of a controversy-resolving mechanism. It is only one of the 
factors weighed by a critically minded Ida as portrayed by Michelman, when she 
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assesses to which existing institution she should turn. Suppose, for example, that the 
existing institution is tarnished by past prejudices against, say, political speech, and the 
secretary of defense is suing Ida for defamation on account of her criticism of his 
defense policies. While, as a presentist, Ida bases her judgment of legitimacy only on 
how the institution would decide her case, she is not ignorant of its reputation. Under 
such circumstances, her presumption in favor of the tarnished existing institution cannot 
be fully explained by her inclination toward stability, considering her critical thinking 
ability and disposition. It is not a matter of trading freedom for stability; rather, Ida’s 
critical decision to stick with this institution suggests that she holds that her odds of 
winning the case are good if she does so.165 How does she strike a balance between her 
inclination toward stability and her love of freedom in this situation? 
This balance apparently rests on three interrelated attitudes that she holds 
regarding the existing institution, which have been lumped together and obscured under 
the umbrella of “stability.” First, she has a sympathetic attitude toward the existing 
system, despite its past failure to live up to the principle of protecting political speech. 
Related to the first position above, Ida’s weighing of freedom against stability indicates, 
as well, that she regards the institution’s repressive past as aberrant rather than 
characteristic of the current governmental system. Third, it implies what Jack Balkin 
calls a “moral optimism” in Ida’s attitude toward the existing institution.166 From Ida’s 
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perspective, the existing institution’s past decisions in favor of restricting political 
speech were mere mistakes; the institution can correct itself and thus be trusted to 
adjudicate her case. 
Thus, in the version of constitutional legitimacy portrayed in “Ida’s way,” we 
find, disguised as an inclination toward stability, Ida’s “faith” in the self-correctability of 
the existing system. Implicit in her tolerant attitude, characterized by “writing off [moral 
mishaps in the systemic history] as ‘mistakes,’”167 is not merely a confidence in the 
future but a belief that the existing system contains mechanisms that will eventually 
correct all that has gone wrong.168 
Although the preceding account of Ida’s attitude toward the existing system 
seems to suggest that the constitution or, rather, the whole constitutional system-in-place 
is capable of promoting its own legitimacy “by being a common project of interpretation 
by different members of the political community,”169 Michelman does not agree. He 
speaks of being “nervous” about the attributes of a common-project constitution.170 
According to him, any justification of constitutionalism as practice must be based on 
presentist first-person judgment; thus, he resists the notion of the constitution as a set 
object of the common project of interpretation. He does not accept a conception that can 
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be justified “[only] by faith and not by works or by reason.”171 Ida’s choice of the 
existing institution, Michelman emphasizes, rests on her belief in the common need for 
security, which stands apart from the historically oriented type of faith in a 
cross-generational common project and its corresponding transtemporal collective 
subject.172 In other words, while Ida’s belief that the existing institution under the 
constitutional system-in-place will get her case right sounds like “constitutional 
patriotism” or “constitutional faith” that connotes a common-project constitution,173 
from Michelman’s perspective, her belief is simply “a faith in the efficacy of reason in 
history.”174  
In sum, the idea of “faith” in Michelman’s presentist, holistic view of legitimacy 
plays a role in each of Ida’s singular acts of reasoning and has less to do than with who 
Ida is. So construed, the Michelmanian “Ida’s way” might hold up without being 
tarnished with the traces of constitutional authorship. Yet, this mission would be 
accomplished at a cost. The price is the very idea that legitimacy is a public matter at the 
center of a democratic society. The presentist, first-person standpoint of “Ida’s way” 
suggests a tendency to treat the appraisal of legitimacy as “a private matter of each 
individual with his or her own conscience.”175 To maintain the query as a public matter, 
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Michelman believes that an intersubjective “we” will materialize in the judgment of 
legitimacy. 176  Is the “we” that is understood here, from Michelman’s presentist, 
first-person standpoint of legitimacy, ahistorical and thus distinct from “We the People” 
of constitutional authorship? 
In “Ida’s way,” the assessment of legitimacy is considered personal; however, the 
choice of controversy-resolving mechanism is not made by any single Ida. Whether an 
existing institution with a history of repressing political speech appears reliable to Ida, as 
an impartial mechanism for adjudicating her present case, depends on Ida’s calculation 
of several variables, based on her personal judgment.177 However, in a controversy or a 
case, the personal judgments of two or more parties are involved; these judgments must 
converge on the choice of a resolution mechanism.178 Thus, as parties to a controversy, 
a number of Idas are involved in a two- or multiparty “intended action.”179 Justifying 
the choice of a particular institution as the mechanism to resolve the controversy is an 
integral part of constitutional interpretation, which aims to “render [essential 
constitutional] items acceptable to everyone as reasonable.”180 From the perspective of a 
presentist, critically minded Ida, the decision must be justified every time a controversy 
concerning public authority seeks resolution through constitutional interpretation. In the 
name of stability, however, the part of constitutional interpretation regarding the choice 
of institutional mechanism as conceived in “Ida’s way” consistently comes to the same 
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conclusion. In other words, once justified, the institution becomes the presumptive 
institution of choice for subsequent interpreters, carrying over into the future. Does this 
not suggest that constitutional interpretation as envisaged in “Ida’s way” is subject to a 
transtemporal framework, at least in regard to the choice of the controversy-resolving 
mechanism? 
Michelman might assert to the contrary that “[t]o Ida, every moment is seen as if 
it had no past and thus as a kind of new beginning.”181 As a presentist, in each instance 
of constitutional interpretation, Ida may act like a revolutionary who “resolutely turn[s] 
[her] back on [her] past in order to build a radically new future.”182 In this picture, 
choosing a particular institution every time would not be part of a transtemporal project 
but, rather, would result from “normative coherence as an ideal property of legal system 
at a given moment in time, of a momentary legal system.”183 Yet, Michelman’s Ida does 
not interpret the constitutional system-in-place at a given moment in time without 
bearing in mind the impact of her present interpretation on her future position. As noted 
above, even if the conception of legitimacy in “Ida’s way” is a personal judgment on 
whether the existing institution will “render [essential constitutional] items acceptable to 
everyone as reasonable,”184 it must involve more than a single Ida. Ida A’s presentist 
judgment on the institution-in-place and her interpretive position on the disputed 
essential constitutional item will be assessed by her contemporary fellow Idas within and 
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outside the controversy. Moreover, once adopted by the deciding institution, Ida’s 
interpretive position would become part of the record of the institutional mechanism in 
charge of resolving the controversy, which would impinge, in turn, on the rational 
decision of future generations concerning that institution. Thus, the assumed rational 
adherence to a particular chosen institution in “Ida’s way” reflects the fact that the 
justification for choosing the particular controversy-resolving mechanism in the past 
must be accepted by contemporary Idas and can be carried over. In other words, when 
Idas in the past chose the institution in preference over others, they already took into 
account the impact of their decision on the future.  
This does not mean that present-day Idas are bound by the decision of Idas of 
past generations. Moreover, Ida herself may “resolutely turn [her] back on [her] past” in 
every instance of constitutional interpretation and thus make her position 
“momentary.”185 Nevertheless, her constant adherence to a particular institution, as an 
integral part of constitutional interpretation in Ida’s “presentist, full-merits” view of 
legitimacy, indicates that the time frame conceived in Ida’s interpretation of the 
constitution is not momentary but extends beyond the present instance. Without any 
concern for the future, the present generation would not make an institutional choice that 
critically minded future generations would accept. Retaining the initial institutional 
choice as the default mechanism for deciding controversies becomes the common 
purpose of every instance of constitutional interpretation. 
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Moreover, if the time frame conceived of in each instance of constitutional 
interpretation is temporally extended, a transtemporal project will be necessary to 
include and connect all temporally extended positions on the meaning of the 
constitution. 186  Without this transtemporal purpose, the choice of a default 
controversy-solving institution will lose normative coherence. If this choice is an 
integral part of Michelman’s conception of constitutional interpretation, and if it is 
undertaken within a transtemporal framework, the whole enterprise of constitutional 
interpretation remains within the same time frame. Each constitutional interpretation 
may seem to be presentist because it is not commanded by the past. Nonetheless, under 
the transtemporal framework, instances of constitutional interpretation constitute a 
common project.187 Without the expectation of a future on which a present interpretive 
position will have influence, the present decision is emptied of significance and taken 
lightly, to be decided de novo in the next instance of interpretation.188 Thus, the 
legitimacy described in “Ida’s way” still suggests a projection forward to the future and 
backward to the past.189 
As discussed above, at the center of constitutional authorship in the vein of 
constructive reflexivity is the identity of the first-person plural “we,” which emerges 
from the process of constitutional deliberation as a transtemporal common project. In 
this view, interpretation undertakes to uncover the meaning of given constitutional 
                                                
186 Cf. id. at 222. 
187 See RUBENFELD, supra note 150. 
188 See Postema, supra note 98, at 209. 
189 See id. at 219–225. See also Balkin, supra note 10, at 494. 
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provisions. 190  The analysis herein shows that the holistic, presentist, first-person 
judgment of legitimacy in the form of constitutional interpretation takes place within a 
transtemporal framework under which an intersubjective “we” would form among 
Michelman’s Idas interpreting the constitution.191 Thus, in “Ida’s way,” the notion of 
“constitutional identity” is transtemporal as well. At the core of the constitutional system 
lies something deeper and richer than the existing political regime, transcending the 
institutional performances of particular periods.192 This makes Ida’s interpretive activity 
part of the unfolding of the core of the constitutional system. If this presumed common 
frame of mind and transtemporal constitutional identity grounds Ida’s judgment 
regarding legitimacy, it is self-contradictory that Michelman refutes the presupposed 
identitarian sense of “we” in the formation of a first-person plural authorial subject of 
the constitution “We the People.” Michelman’s expressly presentist position 
notwithstanding, his presumption of the existing institution as the controversy-resolving 
mechanism among Idas points to the structure of constitutional authorship. 
To sum up, to avoid the incompleteness of both legal nonvolitionalism and 
contractarianism as well as the risk of reducing legitimacy to a private matter, 
Michelman needs to base his theory of the legitimacy of constitutional democracy on 
what he characterizes as constitutional authorship, which, as shown above, is supported 
by his turn in “Ida’s way.” Identification with the past and past deeds, implicit in Ida’s 
inclination toward the existing system and her general interpretive position, not only 
                                                
190 See Michelman, Constitutional Patriotism, supra note 10, at 1025. 
191 See Michelman, Reply, supra note 10, at 660. 
192 See also Balkin, supra note 10, at 500. 
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makes “Ida’s way” possible, as a public view of legitimacy, but also bears out the 
presupposed transtemporal identitarian sense of “we” in the formation of a first-person 
plural, constitutional selfhood.193 Thus, Ida’s view of legitimacy is not so much an 
alternative to constitutional authorship as it is an account of it. 
 
5. Conclusion 
While constitutional scholars cannot settle on a theory of legitimacy, and the specter of a 
legitimacy deficit continues to haunt those who envision future constitutional projects, 
constitutional authorship occupies a pivotal place in debates on the legitimacy of 
constitutional democracy, including the debate on constitutionalization in the EU.194 
This article has sought to shed light on why constitutional authorship occupies center 
stage by engaging with Michelman’s scholarship on legitimacy. 
The foregoing analysis shows that Michelman’s careful examination of the three 
major schools of thought on constitutional legitimacy suggests that both the 
contract-based and acceptance-oriented conceptions of that legitimacy boil down to 
reconfigurations of constitutional authorship. Nonetheless, Michelman persists in 
distancing himself from the scholarly camp that espouses constitutional authorship 
because it presupposes a transtemporal concept of constitutional authorship, pointing to 
a presumed conceptual structure of identity formation. Countering this uncritical 
                                                
193 Cf. MÜLLER, supra note 166, at 60–66 (suggesting that a “shared history” is needed to account for 
“attachment and agency” in constitutional patriotism). 
194 See, e.g., Eriksen, supra note 6, at 49. 
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position, Michelman proposes a presentist alternative theoretical approach to the 
question of legitimacy. 
By dissecting Michelman’s theoretical engagement, this investigation has shown 
that his presentist alternative is unsuccessful. He cannot fully account for the commonly 
chosen, authoritative dispute-settling public institutions whose legitimacy lies at the core 
of his presentist view of legitimacy, without presupposing a transtemporal view of 
identity. In this way, Michelman’s partial presentist view of constitutional democracy 
actually bolsters constitutional authorship, which remains the Gordian knot of legitimacy 
theory. 
